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REGULATION for INNOVATION 
- A Comparative Inquiry into a Regulatory Pair of Twins 
 
Purpose of this contribution 
Some regulations aim to improve innovation or technological 
advancement, or at least remove possible obstacles. Competition law, 
both national and European, is a less known part of the law and is 
mostly handled by specialised lawyers. The purpose of this 
contribution is to make the part of competition law that aims to 
improve innovation more widely known. Two more or less 
corresponding European regulations will undergo a comparative 
analysis. An attempt will be made to explain the meaning of these 
regulations in terms of innovation improvement. An assessment will 
be made on whether these regulations should both remain in force 
individually or whether they can be combined into one regulation. The 
reader will not be expected to have an in-depth knowledge of 
competition law; an interest in the impact of regulation on the 
innovative capacity of trade and industry will suffice, or rather, an 
interest in the theme Innovation and Regulation. 
 
Introduction 
In this contribution “innovation” refers to technological improvements 
in trade and industry that result from innovations in products, 
processes and organisations. Regulations aimed at stimulating such 
innovations by providing opportunities, under certain conditions, for 
undertakings to work together to create innovation, belong to 
competition law (UK) or antitrust law (US). This legal area is at the 
intersection of administrative law and business law, thus public and 
private law. The paradigm Managerial Law1 helps clarify the meaning 
of the law for the business sector. This paradigm combines (1) the 
distinction between managerial functions and the structure of these 
managerial functions and (2) two important objectives of legislation: 
the normative and the instrumental element. The paradigm helps to 
position the subject of this paper in the following way.  
(Ad 1) Investment in the development of new or improved technology 
refers at least to the financial managerial function as resources have 
to be made available that cannot be spent elsewhere. Where 
improvement refers to product technology it will also involve the 
production function. For this contribution we have chosen to focus on 
the way in which competition law stimulates cooperation between 
undertakings for innovative purposes, which naturally implies the 
involvement of strategic management. 
                                       
1 A. Brack, The Paradigm of Managerial Law, The Journal of Legal Studies Education, 
Vol 15, no 2, (Summer 1997), 237-244; A. Brack, A Managerial Format for a 
Business Legal Audit, European Business Law Review, January/February 
2001,Volume 12, Issues 1/2, 34-39; A. Brack, Bedrijfsrecht op een bedrijfskundige 
manier, 4th ed., Groningen/Houten, Wolters-Noordhoff Publishers, 2007 
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(Ad 2) The normative objective of law and legislation is the most 
obvious: rules that constrict the behaviour of persons and businesses 
and limit that behaviour within certain frameworks. When applied to 
managerial functions of undertakings, the normative element of 
legislation imposes limitations on the freedom of movement of the 
operational and strategic management.2 The instrumental element of 
law and legislation is much less obvious.3 Non-normative, neutral 
judicial tools, such as agreements, patents and trademarks enable 
management to establish relationships and protect properties. Legal 
persons are the building bricks for establishing a group of subsidiary 
companies subordinate to the Management Board of a shareholding 
corporation. The normative element of competition law is obvious:  
strategic management of an undertaking is severely limited in its 
ability to make arrangements with competitors and the long-term 
consolidation of undertakings in the form of a merger or takeover is in 
principle prohibited without prior consent from an Antitrust 
Authority.  
 
Within the primarily normative system of competition law, there are 
some legal instruments that aim to facilitate cooperation between 
undertakings under certain conditions. The goal is to achieve certain 
societally desirable goals that would have been difficult or impossible 
to achieve without these forms of cooperation. This is done through 
the use of the legal vehicle of the block exemption regulation (BER). We 
will provide a short introduction of the main points of competition law 
in order to explain how cooperation between undertakings is 
stimulated within a system that is focused on preventing the 
restriction of competition between undertakings.  
 
Competition law: system and policy 
This contribution is not about the private law version of “competition 
law” that is the domain of topics such as trade practices, commercial 
publicity, trademarks and advertising. Conversely, our concern here is 
with the public law version: the influence of the regulatory agency on 
the degree of competition in markets. The Anglo-American notion of 
                                       
2 Product safety regulations and product liability rules restrict the freedom of project 
developers. See for example A. Brack, The CE-mark and the new European 
approach to product law: a system of fundamental legal safety requirements and 
technical specification standards, International Journal for Consumer and Product 
Safety, Vol. 6. No 2 (1999), pp. 45-59 and A. Brack, A Disadvantageous Dichotomy 
in Product Safety Law – Some reflections on sense and nonsense of the distinction 
food-non-food in European Product Safety Law, (under review) 
 
3 For example: A. Brack and J.F.B. Gieskes, European Legal Developments in 
Product Liability and Product Safety and the Total Quality Management Approach, 
International Journal of Materials & Product Technology, Vol.5 nr.4 (1990), 311-326. 
See also A. Brack and J.C. de Ruyter, European Legal Developments in Product 
Safety and Liability: the Role of Customer Complaint Management as a Defensive 
Marketing Tool,  International Journal of Research in Marketing, Vol. 10, nr. 2 (1993), 
153-164 
 
 3
antitrust law is a better indicator of the key issue, the prohibition of 
restrictive practices: competition, that is at least non-cooperation 
between firms, is the norm. European law, and more specifically 
European competition law, has a supranational dominance. The 
Treaty on the European Union articulates (in Article 2) - amongst 
other objectives - the promotion of economic and social progress, in 
particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers. 
The common rules on competition (Articles 81, 82 and 83 EU Treaty) 
are an important means to achieve these objectives. They are the 
foundation of European competition law which, as a system, basically 
consists of the following three parts 
(i) Prohibition of Cartels (Article 81) 
(ii) Prohibition of the Abuse of a Dominant Position (Article 82) 
(iii) Control of Concentrations (EC Merger Regulation4). 
  
  
This could be denominated as the first level of European competition 
law. Hereafter, we will see that in the context of this contribution 
generally two other levels can be distinguished. In light of the main 
subject of this paper, regulation for innovation, we will focus on the 
first part (i, above): cartels are anti-competitive agreements. The 
broadly defined term “collusion” is often used because it covers all the 
categories of anti-competitive behaviour mentioned in Article 81 
namely agreements (written as well as oral), decisions of associations 
and concerted practices (i.e.: co-ordination of conduct). A difference 
with USA antitrust law, which is directly focused on maintaining 
competition, is that the creation of the common market – an area 
without internal frontiers – is the EU's main objective. It’s not so 
much the restriction on competition, but the restriction on trade 
between the Member States that should first and foremost be 
prevented. Fostering good competitive relations is a secondary 
objective. 
  
Collusions are prohibited as incompatible with the common market if 
they have as their objective or effect the “prevention, restriction or 
distortion” of competition within the common market. Article 81 EC 
Treaty mentions examples of these restrictive practices such as the 
fixing of prices, the controlling of production volumes, the sharing of 
markets. Collusions or cartels are automatically void and can be 
sanctioned with very high fines. 
It must be clear that the principal rule, cartels are prohibited, cannot 
always and absolutely be maintained. This would constitute a severely 
unsubtle approach. The rule must be applied in an efficient and 
effective manner. According to the so-called de minimis-rule 
insignificant cartels that do not have a noticeable effect on 
competition will not be dealt with. Another, more important derogation 
                                       
4 Regulation 139/2004/EC of the Council of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, OJ (2004) L24/1 
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from the principal rule states that a certain level of restriction on 
competition is allowed, provided that important societal advantages 
can be achieved, and provided that competition will not be restricted 
any further than is necessary to achieve these advantages. At this 
point competition laws meets the overall objective of the Treaty: 
economic progress. Article 81(3) provides the possibility to exempt 
certain agreements from the prohibition in article 81(1) on the basis of 
certain policy considerations. The agreements are then no longer void, 
but perfectly valid. The Prohibition of Cartels may be declared 
inapplicable in the case of any agreement (and any decision by an 
association, and any concerted practice) 
 
“which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods 
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit (…)” 
 
It is obvious that this part of European competition law makes it 
possible to develop and maintain innovation-fostering policies. 
 
Before we turn to rules of the second level – one level below the 
Articles of the Treaty – it is important to realise that in the past the 
exception of Article 81(3) could take two alternative forms: 
(a) a requested and individually granted exemption from the 
prohibition rule, and 
(b) a so-called block exemption granted beforehand to a certain 
category of agreements. 
 
 The European Commission’s practice of applying Article 81 (3) has 
undergone two important changes as the Community developed over 
the years. Initially, the Commission only granted individual 
exemptions. After gaining experience in this mode of application, the 
Commission started to codify these individual cases in so called block 
(or “group”) exemptions, which state the conditions for the application 
of Article 81(3). The procedure for companies that wanted to cooperate 
in one way or another now became as follows: first one would look for 
the relevant block exemption and assess whether the cartel meets the 
criteria, so that the wording could be aligned with these criteria in the 
initial drafting of the agreement. If there was no relevant block 
exemption or if it proved impossible to adjust the cartel to the 
available exemption, the second step would follow: the request for an 
individual exemption. After European corporations and European 
bureaucracy had operated this way for years, an important change 
came into effect as of May 1, 2004. It was no coincidence that with the 
expansion of the EU with a large number of Member States a new 
regulation came into effect modernising all competition law 
procedures.5 
                                       
5 Council Regulation 1/2003/EC of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L1/1 
 5
 
By far the most important change concerned the abolishment of the 
possibility for cooperating undertakings to submit their agreement to 
the Commission prior to obtaining dispensation. The backlog in the 
assessment of applications had become too extensive and the 
Commission wanted a new and more efficient approach. It wanted to 
spend its human and financial resources on actively investigating the 
existence of large harmful cartels. The enforcement of the cartel 
prohibition and the assessment of the exemption possibilities under 
article 81 (3) has become the responsibility of national competition 
authorities and the courts of law. Therefore, from now on only ex post 
assessment will take place. Analyses of whether agreements are 
permissible under European law have become even more important 
and have become increasingly the responsibility of the cooperating 
undertakings. 
 
Block Exemption Regulations 6 
Drafting a BER is a creation of legislation on the second level: a 
detailed and specific elaboration of a rule of the first level. A typical 
BER in the field of competition law includes the conditions on the 
basis whereof an agreement will be allowed, that is to say formally 
that the rule of Article 81(1) (Prohibition of Cartels) is declared 
inapplicable in the case of agreements that fulfil the terms formulated 
in the BER. This allows the legislator to determine specific policy 
objectives for a certain area. 
At this point it would be adequate to introduce another basic 
distinction that is essential to the application of competition law. This 
is the distinction between horizontal and vertical cartels. The criterion 
for the distinction is the answer to the question whether or not the 
undertakings involved are operating at the same level in the 
production and distribution chain. Suppose that the contracting 
parties are both in the wholesale trade of certain spirituous beverages. 
Such an agreement is classified as a horizontal cartel. If, on the other 
hand, the parties are on different levels of the supply chain, their 
agreement would be classified as a vertical one, like the agreement 
between an importer and the dealers of a certain brand of cars. 
Companies that become part of a horizontal cartel are restricting 
competition per definition, because they are competitors. 
  
Vertical agreements, on the other hand, are not necessarily restrictive 
of competition as the undertakings involved are not each other’s direct 
competitors. The distinction is relevant because in the area of 
competition policy it is communis opinio that a horizontal cartel will 
most likely constitute a serious infringement of the prohibition to 
restrict competition7, whereas vertical cartels are usually judged more 
leniently. This explains why there are or have been much more BERs 
                                       
6 The abbreviation BER is not unusual. 
7 It goes without saying that the same goes for mixed cartels, which is a combination 
of horizontal and vertical arrangements in one big cartel. 
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for vertical agreements than for horizontal agreements. For several 
years now there is even a generally applicable BER for all vertical 
arrangements. Block exemptions can be laid down in a Council 
Regulation or in a Commission Regulation and most BERs relate to a 
certain industry such as agriculture, motor vehicles, insurance and 
remarkably many branches of the transportation industry: liner 
shipping, airport services, maritime transport and so on. These are 
usually mixed or vertical agreements. 
 
With regard to horizontal cartels only a few block exemptions have 
been established. Two of these relate to improvements of knowledge 
and it certainly is interesting to research whether it’s a coincidence 
that these block exemptions were created on the same date:  
- BER on specialisation agreements8, 
- BER on research & development agreements9. 
We will conduct a comparative analysis of both regulations and will 
also refer to the sources of information of the third level: the 
Guidelines.10  
Sources of the first and second level, articles of the EC Treaty and 
Council and Commission Regulations, are formal legal documents 
that fall under the category of legislation. Guidelines, on the other 
hand, are informal communications or “notices” published on behalf 
of the Commission. They are meant to be a more or less official 
explanation on how to handle legal documents of the second level and 
are, in that capacity, very interesting. Obviously, the European Court 
of Justice and the Court of First Instance have to take legislation as 
an invariable fact but they are in no way bound by the text of 
guidelines drafted by the Commission. Until now the Commission has 
published guidelines in the years 2000 on vertical restraints, in 2001 
on horizontal cooperation agreements and in 2004 on technology 
transfer (the licensing of IPR: industrial or intellectual property rights). 
We will refer to the above mentioned guidelines as the “Horizontal 
Guidelines”. 
   
 
Preview: comparison of recitals 
Instead of an Explanatory Memorandum, on Member State level, that 
usually accompanies a proposed piece of legislation on its way to 
Parliament and which, after enactment, is of important value to 
understand and interpret the provisions of that law, a legislative 
document of the European Union is preceded by a collection of 
                                       
8 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2658/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements, 
OJ 2000 L 304/3 
9 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development 
agreements, OJ 2000 L 304/7 
10 Guidelines on the application of Article 81 EC to horizontal cooperation 
agreements, OJ 2001 C 3/2 
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considerations (which regularly begin with “Whereas”) the sequence of 
which is indicated by numbers. These are commonly referred to as 
“recitals”. The entirety of the recitals is essential to comprehend the 
full scope of such a regulation in all its parts, sections and articles. 
 
At first glance the recitals of both BERs create the presumption that 
we are dealing with two very similar regulations. Both of the first 
recitals (1) mention the European Commission’s competence to apply 
the exemption provision of the cartel prohibition to certain cartels 
(“certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices”) 
which have as their objective specialisation (Regulation 2658/2000, 
hereafter BER-SPEC) or the research and development of products or 
processes (Regulation 2659/2000, hereafter BER-R&D) respectively. 
The next recital (2) mentions that the foregoing regulation on 
specialisation (417/85) expires on 31.12.2000. In the case of R&D two 
specific recitals have been inserted. On the one hand the reference to 
a special provision in the Treaty (163-2) on research and technological 
development in undertakings and their collaboration with research 
centres and universities and on the other hand on the possibility that 
these forms of collaboration may not qualify as cartels from a 
competition law point of view. Subsequently, the twin provision of 
recital (4) mentions that the foregoing regulation on research and 
development agreements (418/85) also expires on 31.12.2000. 
  
The following five recitals are completely identical. 
Recitals (3) and (5) refer to general requirements of a new regulation 
starting January 1, 2001. Two required key concepts are mentioned:  
- simplify both administrative supervision and legislative framework,  
- presume in general that below a certain level of market power the 
positive effects of these agreements outweigh any (sic) negative effects 
on competition. 
Recitals (4, 5) and (6, 7) define a modern approach, the so-called  
“economics-based”, namely to move away from the legal technique of 
listing exempted clauses in agreements but to define the categories of 
agreements which are exempted and the listing of restrictive clauses 
not to be contained in these agreements. Recitals (6, 7) and (8, 9) 
contain generalities connected to the chosen modern technique of 
applying the regulatory or “block” exemption on the prohibition of 
cartels. 
 
Recitals (8) through (13) in the BER-SPEC are specifically regarding 
the content of specialisation as recitals (10) through (16) in the BER-
R&D are specific to the content of research and development. We will 
discuss these substantive considerations later on, when we assess the 
significance of these regulations in promoting technological 
innovation. 
  
The remainder of the recitals in both regulations is yet again identical 
or more or less identical. Recitals (14), (15) and (16) in the one BER 
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and recitals (17), (18) and (19) in the other BER are totally unisonant 
and contain standard considerations such as: 
- the exemption may not cover restrictions of competition which are 
not indispensable for the expected benefits, 
- certain so-called “hard core”11 restrictions of competition such as 
price fixing are not allowed in any circumstances, 
- as a final piece of regulatory responsibilities the Commission has the 
possibility to hit a legal safety break: should an exempted agreement 
nevertheless, unexpectedly, have severe negative effects on 
competition, the Commission is empowered to withdraw the benefit of 
the block exemption for this agreement. 
Recitals (17), (18) and (19) in the one BER and recitals (21), (22) and 
(23) in the other one contain the concluding recitals. Insignificant 
arguments are given as to why the period of validity of these BERs 
should be set at ten years: “specialisation agreements can have a 
bearing on the structure of the participating undertakings”12 and 
“research and development agreements are often of a long-term 
nature”. Subsequently, the penultimate recital contains the statement 
that the regulation(s) “is without prejudice to the application of Article 
82 of the Treaty” which is rather obvious, because the article of the 
Treaty covering the prohibition of cartels is Article 81. This statement 
is made for the record, because in theory, collaborating undertakings 
could abuse their collective position of dominance which in itself 
would constitute an impediment of competition. And finally, the recital 
that the principle of supremacy of Community law entails that 
national measures cannot detract from the uniform application of this 
regulation throughout the common market. 
   
Comparison of articles 
These two BERs replace their predecessors which both expired on 31 
December 2000. The BER on Specialisation (BERSPEC) and the BER 
on Research and Development (BER-R&D) have a lot of provisions in 
common and show more or less the same structure. In fact there is a 
remarkable resemblance, as we had expected from the comparative 
overview of the recitals. Both regulations contain 9 articles with 
headings. These headings are similar for seven out of the nine articles. 
However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that articles with a similar 
heading also contain similar text. The contents of these articles will be 
discussed below. First, a short overview will be given. 
 
Article 1, titled “Exemption”, stipulates the exemption from the cartel 
prohibition and distinguishes between three varieties of specialisation, 
and respectively three varieties of R&D. 
Article 2 (“Definitions”) defines the key terminology. 
                                       
11 “Hard core” is well-known jargon within the domain of Competition Law for severe 
restrictions of competition in any case inexcusable and incompatible with the 
business enterprise system. 
12 “Undertaking” is euro-legal jargon for business enterprise. 
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In the BER-SPEC Article 3 has the title “Purchasing and marketing 
arrangements” and contains an additional exemption for an exclusive 
purchase and/or supply obligation in the context of a specialisation 
agreement, or for a joint distribution agreement. In the BER-R&D on 
the other hand, article 3 (“Conditions for exemption”) stipulates 
additional conditions for the application of the exemption. 
In addition, in the BER-SPEC article 4, entitled “Market share 
threshold”, establishes a maximum market share of 20%, whilst in the 
BER-R&D article 4 (“Market share threshold and duration of 
exemption”) the market share is established at 25%. The latter article 
also contains special, additional provisions on the validity period of 
the exemption in specific cases in practice. 
The other articles, in line with the first two articles, have similar 
headings. Article 5: “Agreements not covered by the exemption”, lists 
in both regulations so-called hard core agreements that are never 
allowed in any domain of competition law. Both articles 6 are titled 
“Application of the market share threshold” and contain a flexible 
application of the market share criteria. Article 7 in both regulations 
is entitled “Withdrawal”, which refers to the competence of the 
Commission to withdraw the benefits of the BER. Article 8 
(“Transitional period”) formulates a rule for the transition from the 
preceding Regulations No. 417/85 and 418/85 to the current No. 
2658/2000 and 2659/2000. And article 9 finally, entitled “Period of 
validity”, states that the current regulations will come into effect on 1 
January 2001 and expire on 31 December 2010. 
 
In the light of this comparative study we can qualify the provisions by 
applying a threefold system with an increasing scale of substantive 
difference: identical, generic and specific. The qualification identical 
means that the provision in both BERs is textually identical both in 
content and heading. Two out of the nine articles meet this 
qualification, namely the last two articles of both regulations. If we 
apply this criteria more loosely to sections of the articles, then a much 
larger portion of the regulations qualifies as identical. Generic means: 
the text of the article contains a reference to specialisation agreements 
or research and development agreements, but the text of the 
comparable articles are mostly identical. Four out of nine articles are 
considerably generic, but also contain specific elements. An article is 
qualified as specific if the text (or part of the text) is focused on 
specialisation or R&D. Three out of nine articles have an important or 
predominantly specific content. 
 
Provisions specific to specialisation 
Article 1 BERSPEC declares that the prohibition of cartels in the 
Treaty (art 81.1) is not applicable (according to art. 81-3) to the 
following three types of specialisation agreements between two or 
more undertakings. 
- Unilateral specialisation agreements: one party agrees to cease or 
refrain from the production of certain products and purchase them 
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from a competitor while this competitor agrees to produce and supply 
those products (party A no longer produces product X and agrees to 
purchase this product from party B). 
- Reciprocal specialisation agreements: two or more parties agree to 
cease or refrain from producing certain different products mutually 
and purchase these products from the other parties (party A no longer 
produces product X and agrees to purchase this product from party B 
while party B no longer produces product Y and agrees to purchase 
this product from party A). 
 - Joint production agreements: two or more parties agree to produce 
certain products jointly, that is together, collectively. 
 
 The only point of exempting an agreement from the cartel prohibition 
is of course if otherwise the prohibition would in fact apply to this 
agreement. Not all cases of specialisation result in the involved 
undertakings meeting the conditions of the cartel prohibition as stated 
in Treaty article 81, which is why this BERSPEC-provision states that 
this must be the case as a systematic, formal condition for exemption. 
In particular, if parties to the agreement are not competitors – for 
instance because they are active in different markets, the cartel 
prohibition will not apply and an exemption will not be necessary. 
Apparently the European legislator values unimpeded innovation 
enhancing activities so highly that exemptions are granted even in 
cases where this is really unnecessary. This also goes for provisions 
contained in specialisation agreements which are directly related to 
the primary object of the agreement such as intellectual property 
rights. One can imagine that for instance in a reciprocal specialisation 
agreement the mutual licensing or “cross-licensing” of these rights is a 
necessary additional provision. 
 
Article 3 BERSPEC widens the exemption to cases where the parties 
accept an exclusive purchase and/or supply obligation in the context 
of the three types of specialisation arrangements. There is also an 
expansion of the exemption foreseen in the case that parties agree to 
not to sell the products resulting from their specialisation efforts 
themselves independently but organise joint distribution instead, or in 
the case of joint production under certain conditions provide for a 
third party distributor. 
 
Article 4 BERSPEC contains the important condition for exemption 
that the combined, that is collective, market share of the participating 
enterprises including connected companies does not exceed 20% of 
the relevant market, which is the market for the products that are the 
result of specialisation.13 
 
                                       
13 As we will see later on there is a generic provision in both regulations providing for 
a flexible application of this market share condition. 
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Article 5 BERSPEC (“Agreements not covered by the exemption”) 
consists of two sections and states in the first one that the exemption 
is not applicable to certain types of agreements. The second section 
provides for an exception. It is a given fact in competition law that 
certain severe impediments on competition can never be allowed, and 
can thus never be exempted from the prohibition. Cartels that contain 
these kinds of impediments are called “hard core”, although the 
impediments themselves are also referred to by the same term. In 
general, as well as in this case, this refers to price fixing, the 
limitation of output or sales and the allocation of markets or 
customers. These restrictions on competition are unacceptable 
because they respectively eliminate price competition, have a price 
enhancing effect under a similar demand and distort the unrestricted 
allocation of demand and supply.  Surprisingly, in specialisation 
cartels these restrictions between participants are allowed in certain 
circumstances. In a unilateral or reciprocal specialisation agreement 
arrangements can be made on production volume. This is also allowed 
in regard to a joint production agreement. In the case of joint 
distribution arrangements are allowed on sales targets and prices 
charged to third parties. 
 
 
Article 7 BERSPEC is concerned with the competence of the 
Commission to withdraw the exemption in certain cases. This article 
is formulated in very general terms: if the exemption of a certain cartel 
based on this BER means that unforeseeable effects occur which are 
incompatible with the conditions of article 81-3 Treaty, the 
Commission can withdraw the advantages of this exemption from this 
cartel. This provision follows by stating that this applies particularly 
in two situations, although very general terms are applied here as 
well, namely that the agreement does not bring about significant 
rationalisation results or if consumers do not receive a fair share of 
the benefits. Subsequently, a somewhat cryptic statement follows, 
namely that withdrawal of the benefits of the exemption can also 
occur if the products subject to specialisation are “not subject (…) to 
effective competition from identical products or products considered 
by users to be equivalent (…)”. If this means that products to be 
developed in a monopolistic market situation can’t benefit from 
specialisation agreements, then what exactly is the meaning of the 
market share threshold?14 
  
Provisions specific to Research and Development 
                                       
14 In this light this provision actually falls within the category of generic. But 
because reference is made to “products which are the subject of the specialisation” 
and because the similar provision in the BER-R&D is more specific, we will regard 
this provision as specific for pragmatic reasons.   
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A preliminary remark is that although the BERSPEC does not contain 
a stand-alone definition of specialisation15, the central definition is, 
however, defined in the BER-R&D as “the acquisition of know-how 
relating to products or processes and the carrying out of theoretical 
analysis, systematic study or experimentation, including experimental 
production, technical testing of products or processes, the 
establishment of the necessary facilities and the obtaining of 
intellectual property rights for the results”. This is a very nice and  
all-encompassing description, especially if one realises that know-how 
is then elaborately defined as “a package of non-patented practical 
information, resulting from experience and testing, which is secret, 
substantial and identified: in this context, ‘secret’ means that the 
know-how is not generally known or easily accessible; ‘substantial’ 
means that the know-how includes information which is 
indispensable for the manufacture of the contract products or the 
application of the contract processes; ‘identified’ means that the 
know-how is described in a sufficiently comprehensive manner so as 
to make it possible to verify that it fulfils the criteria of secrecy and 
substantiality”. This definition clearly does not leave anything to 
chance, though it is questionable whether it really needs to be so 
elaborate. A number of R&D related concepts are subsequently 
defined, such as “contract process”, “contract product” (meaning both 
the results of the R&D agreement) and “exploitation of the results”. 
 
Article 1 BER-R&D declares that the prohibition of cartels in the 
Treaty (art 81.1) is not applicable (according to art. 81-3) to the 
following three types of agreements: 
- joint R&D of products or processes and joint exploitation of the 
results; 
- joint exploitation of the results of R&D of products or processes jointly 
carried out based on a prior agreement between the same parties; 
- joint R&D of products or processes excluding joint exploitation of the 
results. 
Subsequently, similar provisions to the ones in BERSPEC follow, 
namely the formal reservation that the exemption only applies where 
the cartel prohibition would be in effect, and that the exemption also 
applies to agreements that are directly related to the goal and 
necessity of implementation, i.e. refraining from conducting 
competitive R&D activities with third parties. Similar provisions have 
previously been qualified as generic. 
Because the BER-R&D applies to joint R&D and/or joint exploitation 
of results, the following description is useful for a good understanding 
of this regulation: “research and development, or exploitation of the 
results, are carried out ‘jointly’ where the work involved is: 
(a) carried out by a joint team, organisation or undertaking, 
(b) jointly entrusted to a third party, or 
                                       
15 Strictly seen this was not necessary as article 1 describes the three varieties of 
specialisation. 
 
 13
(c) allocated between the parties by way of specialisation in research, 
development, production or distribution” (article 2 section 4 under 11 
BER-R&D). It is quite noteworthy that this quoted text connects 
aspects of research and development with specialisation and thus 
emphasises the interrelationship of the two BERs. 
 
Article 3 BER-R&D is a substantially different provision than article 3 
BERSPEC. The latter could just as easily have been included in article 
1, since it contains an extension of the exemption. Article 3 BER-R&D 
(“Conditions for exemption”), however, states that exemption depends 
on the following specific conditions: 
- for the purpose of further research or exploitation all the agreeing 
parties, cartel insiders, must have access to the results of the joint 
R&D16, 
- each party must be free to exploit the results of the joint R&D 
independently although such exploitation right may be limited to 
some technical fields of application where the parties in their pre-
contractual period were not competing, 
- any joint exploitation must relate to results protected by intellectual 
property rights or constitute know-how, which substantially 
contributes to technical or economic progress and must be decisive for 
the manufacture of the contract products or the application of  
processes. 
Finally, in the following condition there is an overlap with the block 
exemption regulation on specialisation: undertakings that fall under a 
R&D agreement are responsible for production as a form of 
specialisation must accept and fill orders from all parties, unless the 
R&D agreement also provides in joint distribution. This last condition 
can be understood in a way that, in the case of joint distribution, not 
all the parties have to be supplied, but merely the joint distributor. 
 
At first glance Article 4 BER-R&D, entitled “Market share threshold 
and duration of exemption”, seems much more complicated than the 
simple article 4 BERSPEC which just formulates the condition of the 
market share maximum. However, on closer inspection the text 
appears to be needlessly complicated. This is caused by the text of the 
provision that distinguishes between two situations: on the one hand, 
parties are either competitors or not, and on the other hand it 
contains a much too complicated formulation of the period of 
exemption. 
If the parties are not competitors, the duration of the exemption will 
be as long as is required for R&D. It is questionable whether this 
provision is useful, since cooperation will not constitute a restriction 
on competition if the parties aren’t competitors. The duration of joint 
R&D is also not subject to any time restrictions. If the R&D results are 
jointly exploited, the exemption will continue for seven years, from the 
                                       
16 Although research institutes, academic bodies or undertakings which supply R&D 
as a commercial service without normally taking part in the exploitation of the 
results may confine their use of the results just to further research. 
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moment that the jointly developed products are first introduced to the 
common European market. This period appears to be arbitrary and 
because no other indication can be found, we will assume that the 
biblical seven fat and seven lean years were the legislator’s source of 
inspiration. 
When two or more of the participating undertakings are indeed each 
other’s competitors, the abovementioned period17  of exemption will 
only apply when the combined market share of the participating 
undertakings does not exceed 25% of the relevant products. It is 
remarkable though that the moment determined to  measure the 
market share is the moment that the parties joined the R&D 
agreement. Apparently, it does not matter what happens to this 
market share later on. Finally, the article states that after the initial 
period of exemption has expired, the exemption will remain in effect 
as long as the combined market share does not exceed 25%. Thus, it 
is possible that during the initial seven fat years the combined market 
share exceeds the initially allowed maximum significantly, without 
any implications from a competition law point of view.  It seems much 
easier and more effective to begin linking the exemption to the 
maximum allowed market share at the start of the R&D cooperation. 
 
  
Article 5 BER-R&D contains “Agreements not covered by the 
exemption” and is more comprehensive than its equivalent in the 
BERSPEC. The article contains a long list of prohibited agreements, 
that is to say agreements that cannot fall under the exemption and 
are therefore likely to be affected by the cartel prohibition of the 
Treaty. Paragraph 2 contains two exceptions to this rule, so that in 
these situations the exemption does, yet again, apply. 
The “agreements not covered” include, first of all, the previously 
mentioned “hard core” agreements such as limitation of output or 
sales and price fixing that are forbidden throughout the domain of 
competition law. The other agreements not covered are somehow 
related to R&D arrangements and therefore are qualified as specific in 
this paper. Most of these agreements contain restrictions that go 
beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve the goal, namely joint 
R&D and/or joint exploitation of results. An example is the limitation 
of the parties’ freedom to conduct independent research, or in 
cooperation with third parties, in an area that is not related to the 
current agreement. Another example is the protection of the developed 
knowledge with intellectual property rights for a much longer period 
than is necessary for the R&D cooperation. Some prohibitions are 
related to the already mentioned period of seven years: if it benefits 
successful R&D the number of clients that can be approached may be 
limited for this period of time, as can the parties limit the areas in 
which an active sales policy can be conducted. 
                                       
17 It is assumed that this period refers to the seven years and not the period of the 
duration of the R&D, but this is not certain. 
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The following two agreements do not impede exemption according to 
paragraph 2; 
- production targets may be set in cases where the exploitation of the 
results includes the joint production of the contract,  
- where the exploitation of the results includes the joint distribution of 
the contract, products sales targets may be set and prices charged to 
immediate customers may be fixed. 
     
The “Withdrawal” article 7 in the R&D regulation is more extensive 
than in the other block exemption regulation. One reason for 
withdrawal of the benefits of the exemption is identical to the one with 
the cryptic formulation of a quasi monopoly mentioned above. The 
other reasons are specifically related to R&D, namely 
- the existence of this R&D agreement restricts third parties 
substantially in carrying out R&D because of limited research capacity 
elsewhere, 
- the existence of this R&D agreement restricts third parties 
substantially in accessing the market for the contract products 
because of the particular structure of supply, 
- the existence of this R&D agreement makes effective competition in 
R&D on a specific market impossible, 
- without any objectively valid reason the parties are not exploiting the 
results of the joint R&D. 
It is remarkable that the apparently different reasons for a limited or 
absent R&D rest capacity and the further impossibility of R&D 
competition seem to come down to essentially the same thing. It is 
crucial for the exemption in competition law that there is a possibility 
to withdraw the benefits of the exemption if it becomes apparent later 
on that without an objective reason it is impossible to create results of 
societal or economic relevance. 
 
Remaining non-specific provisions: generic and identical 
 
Article 2 BERSPEC contains a number of definitions that are relevant 
for a good understanding, correct interpretation and relevant scope of 
this regulation. Some are merely formal such as the definition of 
“agreement”, which repeats part of the text of article 81 Treaty, which 
describes cartels as “agreement, a decision of an association of 
undertakings or a concerted practice”. Needless to say that the text 
‘agreement means an agreement …’ cannot qualify as a definition. One 
can also question whether it is necessary to define “product” and 
“production”, although these terms are given a somewhat broader 
definition than usual: the provision of a service is included. Other 
definitions are also not specifically related to innovation improvement, 
but are more or less customary in the area of competition law, such as 
the term “connected undertakings”, which, put simply, refers to 
undertakings that are connected to each other in a group structure. 
“Participating undertakings” means undertakings party to the 
agreement and their respective connected undertakings. This 
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unexpectedly broad definition is of major importance to the market 
share limit: undertakings connected through a group structure profit 
a lot less from these block exemptions than independent, or so to say 
stand-alone undertakings. 
  
 A similar term is “competing undertaking” which not just means 
actual competitor but also covers a potential competitor: “an 
undertaking that would, on realistic grounds, undertake the 
necessary additional investments (…) so that it could enter the 
relevant market (…)”. Many of these definitions are identical because 
they correspond to normal spoken language or have a more or less 
standardised meaning within the field of competition law. The 
definitions that are not specifically related to R&D are identical to the 
definitions of these terms in the other regulation. Therefore, it is on 
the basis of systematic, regulation-technical design reasons that a 
larger number of terms are defined in the BER-R&D. In another 
systematic-technical design the definition article could have been 
identical or practically identical. 
 
As mentioned before, in both articles 5 (“Agreements not covered by 
the exemption”) the definitions of ‘hard core’ cartels and ‘hard core’ 
clauses in agreements are identical. 
 
The BERSPEC applies a market share of 20% of the relevant market, 
whereas the BER-R&D applies a percentage of 25. In both articles 6 
(“Application of the market share threshold”) two subjects are 
regulated. It is indicated how the percentages should be calculated, 
namely preferably on the basis of market sales value or, where this is 
not possible, on market share volumes. Furthermore, the market 
share rule is softened, so as to prevent fluctuations in market shares 
would result in the block exemption sometimes applying and 
sometimes not applying. This is a matter of effectiveness and legal 
certainty. If the increase in the market share is limited to a maximum 
of 5%, the exemption will remain in effect for a further two years. If 
the increase exceeds 5%, the exemption will remain in effect for a 
year. An undertaking cannot receive a suspension for more than two 
years in total.18 Except for the percentages, the text of the articles is 
identical. 
 
The two final provisions of both regulations are completely identical. 
Article 8 (“Transitional period”) played an important role when both 
regulations came into effect on January 1, 2001. Articles 9 (“Period of 
validity”) declare that the regulation shall expire on December 31, 
2010. 
 
Evaluation and recommendations 
                                       
18 In fact a choice has to be made then between either disposing of market share or 
forming a yet unofficial self-judgment regarding the validity of a direct referral to 
Article 81-3 Treaty. 
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The number of articles and parts of articles in the BER specialisation 
and R&D that are identical or generic exceeds the number of specific 
provisions. This makes it worthwhile to assess whether both 
regulations can be brought together into one. Reducing the number of 
regulations would be an important contribution to lowering the 
regulatory burden on undertakings. Because the block exemption 
regulations on specialisation and R&D appeared to be very similar at 
first glance, this comparative study was carried out. One could 
consider including the BER on Technology Transfer19 in a follow-up 
study, because it aims to achieve the same policy objectives. 
  
The existence of competition law as a system of rules concerning 
collusions and limitations of competition between undertakings is 
widely known in circles of business enterprises. Cartels are 
prohibited. It is therefore remarkable that collaboration between 
undertakings is allowed “which contributes to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress” (article 81(3) Treaty). Specialisation in production 
and the acquisition of know-how related to products and processes 
through research and development are supposed to be such 
contributions. This sends an important positive signal.  
Even though there is very little insight into how much undertakings 
gain from the advantages of these block exemption regulations, and 
even though it is not certain which specialisation and R&D 
agreements would fall under the cartel prohibition without this BER, 
it is – as such- a positive point that these BERs emphasise that 
collaboration between undertakings is allowed in the light of 
innovation and technical and economic progress. 
 
Given that the existence of these regulations is regarded as positive, 
the question arises in what form they will be continued after 
December 31, 2010. We can connect to a part of the text in the 
identical recital (3 BERSPEC and 5 BER-R&D): 
 
 “A new regulation should meet the two requirements of ensuring 
effective protection of competition and providing adequate legal security 
for undertakings. The pursuit of these objectives should take account of 
the need to simplify administrative supervision and the legislative 
framework to as great an extent as possible. (…).” 
 
This text, that almost ten years ago was going to be part of the two 
Commission Regulations that were assessed in this paper, will no 
longer have legal force on the date of expiration of these regulations: 
December 31, 2010. However, the objective laid out in this text is still 
widely supported. Even more so, reduction of the regulatory burden is 
                                       
19 Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ 
27.4.2004, L 123/11 
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an important goal in the so-called Better Regulation Program.20 
Simplification of these regulations fits perfectly into this program. 
Integration into one regulation is, as mentioned before, certainly 
possible. A recommendation in this light is to consider reducing the 
number of required definitions; one cannot escape the impression that 
some definitions are very obvious and superficial and could be left 
out. Implementing another recommendation would even further 
simplify the consolidation of the exemption on specialisation and R&D 
agreements into one regulation, and that is harmonising the market 
share criterion: couldn’t the specialisation agreements also be exempt 
up to a market share of 25%? At this point in time there is no clear-
cut reason for these different market share criteria. It seems as 
though an arbitrary choice was made back then. Another 
reconsideration regarding the market share criteria might be in order: 
what is the effect of including so called “connected undertakings”? In 
order to preserve sufficient competition it seems sensible to work 
merely with “participating undertakings”. 
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion is a recommandation. This paper recommends that 
the expiring BERs on Specialisation and on Research and 
Development be merged in one new Block Exemption Regulation on 
Co-operation for Innovation. The near occasion of advisable renewal 
creates an excellent opportunity to contribute to the support of 
innovation by “Better Regulation” and a reduction of the legislative 
framework at the same time. 
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20 See for instance the home page of the program’s website 
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm> and specifically 
“A 2nd strategic review of Better Regulation in the European Union”,  Commission 
communication - COM(2008)32 (30 January 2008) 
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